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Standing on Unstable Grounds: A
Reexamination of the WLBT-TV Case 1
STEVEN DOUGLAS CLASSEN

During the 1960s, disparate discourses of consumerism intersected with
concerns regarding race and civil rights in the realm of broadcast law and regulation.
This reexamination of the social and legal struggles surrounding WLBT-TV in
Jackson, Mississippi (1964-69), shows how conflicting consumerisms were mediated
by legal institutions in an attempt to address social tensions, and reveals how the
dominant discourses of liberal consumerism often displaced issues of race.
In 1962, the "Jackson Nonviolent
Movement" began to change business as usual in Mississippi. The upstart organization, comprised largely
of local teens, targeted prominent
Jackson businesses, demanding that
basic employment and consumer
rights be extended to African Americans.2 They insisted that the segregation, degradation, and physical abuse
grimly familiar to black consumers
in the white marketplace be confronted and addressed. In the spring,
when a pregnant African-American
mother was verbally and physically
assaulted by a white grocer, the
Movement called a church meeting,
distributed leaflets, and led a successful boycott against the store. Months
later, this strategy was reemployed
with a massive boycott of downtown
businesses and the demand that "Negro consumers ... [be] treated as
they ought to be-as first class
citizens" (Salter, 1987, pp. 36, 56).
Steven Douglas Classen is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication
Arts, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Also in the spring of 1962, hundreds of miles to the north, President john Kennedy returned to a
popular political campaign theme,
evoking the concerns of a generalized "consumer" in a congressional
address. Explicitly, the president allied himself with this abstract American. Implicitly, his speech defined
the consumer as individuated,
middle-class, moral, and rational.
Throughout the 1960s such implicit
political definitions and more explicit affirmations of the "American
consumer" were common, since proconsumer rhetoric was regarded as
relatively inexpensive and attractive
to middle-class voters. 3
Although the superficially singular discourse of consumerism was
fully engaged i n Washington a n d
Jackson, its practices and meanings
were multiple, mobilized alongside
different contexts, goals, and concerns. And in 1964, with a legal challenge to the racist practices and license of a powerful Mississippi
institution, Jackson’s WLBT-TV,
the disparate consumer concerns
articu-

lated in Washington and Jackson
would find themselves in uneasy juxtaposition. Contrary assumptions regarding the free marketplace were
brought into focus as the Jackson
Movement argued that consumer- ism
entailed matters more funda- mental
than product safety, truthful
advertising or product choice. This
paper examines how the multiple discourses of consumerism intersected
with the legal struggle over WLBTTV, and with larger social, and specifically racial, concerns.
Scrutiny of this specific moment
suggests that troubling social problems are often elided within the formal language, analysis, and operations of law. Of central concern here
is how legal decisions and texts deny
their specifically located social construction and rely on the appropriation of liberal discourses to deflect
direct encounters with social struggle.
With faith in the adequacy of law's
formal justifications, traditional
analyses routinely ignore the social
tensions and assumptions which underlie law and regulation. Frequently
the focus is placed on law's formal
continuity, its formation in the rarified climate of judicial and governmental institutions, or relative transcendence over everyday life and
things political. Instead, this essay
foregrounds the disjunctures and social contingency of law and legal
processes by reexamining the legal
challenge to the license of WLBTTV, describing how dominant
discourses of consumerism interacted
with broadcast regulation and
displaced issues of race.4
Situating legal struggle in this way
reveals the problematic consequences
of translating marginalized or minority concerns into the terms of the
dominant liberal legal establishment.

Further, it cautions students of law
and regulation "not to assume the
coherence and consistency of legal
discourse but to search out the resonances of the social, economic, and
political struggles that reside behind
the smooth surface of legal reasoning and judicial utterance'' (Hum.
1985, p. 16).

THE CHALLENGE TO
WLBT
It is widely acknowledged that the
WLBT-TV challenge (1964-1969)
was a defining moment for the broadcast reform movement of the sixties
and seventies (see discussions of
Krasnow, Longley and Terry, 1982;
Rowland, 1982; Haight and Weinstein,
1981; Cole and Oettinger, 1978). In
the early seventies, citizen and advocacy groups employed the "WLBT
model"-filing petitions to deny license renewals-in fights to change
local broadcast practices. Because the
extended conflict over the WLBT
license established strategic and legal
precedents pertaining to broadcast
reform, scholars have frequently described the WLBT case and its importance.5 Left largely unexamined has
been the relationship of specific social and cultural forces-such as the
disparate discourses of consumerism-to the operations of broadcast
regulation. At the center of this legal
and cultural contest was the concept
of the consumer, consumer rights,
and several related questions: Who
were the consumers of television, and
of this particular broadcast outlet?
What rights, if any, did these consumers have? From 1964 to 1969, in the
midst of a decade that saw the rise of
Ralph Nader, these questions and

others were argued in various
forums including the Federal
Commu-
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nications Commission (FCC) and the
District of Columbia Federal Court
of Appeals. 6
In April of 1964, a coalition of
reformers including Aaron Henry,
the Reverend R.L.T. Smith, and the
New York-based United Church of
Christ (UCC) filed a petition to deny
the license renewal of WLBT television in Jackson, Mississippi. These
petitioners, in a cooperative effort
with other local citizens, began in
1963 to gather evidence systematically demonstrating that the station
was not meeting local public interest
standards. Specifically, their formal
petition alleged: (a) a failure to serve
the local black population; (b) programming that discriminated against
blacks; (c) unfairness in the presentation of issues, especially about race
relations; (d) failure to provide the
community with adequate religious
and other public affairs programming; and (e) an excessive amount of
airtime devoted to commercial announcements (Parker, 1972, p. 2). 7
A lengthy legal battle ensued. Acting on the 1964 petition, the FCC
asked the station for programming
improvement yet granted a short- term
one year license renewal and dismissed
the petitioners as lacking formal
"standing" before the administrative
body (38 FCC 1143). The petitioners
appealed this ruling, resulting in the
1966 District of Columbia Court of
Appeals decision which will be
discussed below (359 F.2d 994). The
1966 judgment remanded consideration
of the case to the FCC, which held
formal hearings regarding the original
complaints and again renewed the
station's license ( 14 FCC 2d 431).
Another appeal to the courts was
made. In 1969 the petitioners claimed
victory as the same D.C. Court of
Appeals chastised commis-

sion hostility toward the public intervenors and revoked the station's license (425 F.2d 543).
Out of this complex legal history,
the present focus is on the early years
of this struggle, and, in particular,
on the legal notion of standing (locus
standi) which was crucial to the seminal 1966 Court of Appeals decision.
Briefly put, the 1966 court ruling
gave local citizens (audience members) "standing" --entitlement to intervene (or the right of direct representation) in administrative agency (FCC)
proceedings. Although "standing" is
a legal concept most often debated
on the formal grounds of process and
precedents, by employing a social
historical perspective we can see how
such formal concepts operate
in, and are situated at, specific historical conjunctures.
Since the 1966 Court of Appeals
decision granted legal standing to
broadcast consumers, and the 1969
opinion revoked WLBT's license,
textbook treatments of this case history often implicitly promote the notion of continuing progress in broadcast regulation and suggest the
progressive movement in this instance was largely the result of individual agents and successful legal
strategy. Rather than attributing a
legal decision to judicial idiosyncrasy
or inherently superior arguments and
formal technique, the task here is to
ask how popular and legal discourses concerning race and consumerism converged and shaped social
and legal consciousness in a particular instance.

"Don't Buy Segregation"
In 1962, even as President
Kennedy was announcing what he
called the consumer's "bill of
rights,"

including a "consumer's right to be
heard," African Americans in Mississippi were testing their voices and
power as consumers in a state notorious for racial violence and oppression. In the small delta community of
Clarksdale, activists engaged in a persistent boycott of merchants with a
history of racial discrimination. The
grassroots effort, led by local resident and state NAACP president
Aaron Henry, was maintained tor
several months and had a significant
economic impact on downtown businesses (Salter, 1987, pp. 29-36).
In the winter of 1962, Jackson became the site of a massive grassroots
effort aimed at pressuring stores and
services dependent upon black patronage. The Jackson Nonviolent
Movement lasted more than six
months and had initial leadership
from the North Jackson Youth Council of the NAACP, a group of young
students advised by Tougaloo College professor John Salter. The
movement received additional guidance and support from other prominent black Missisippians, including
Aaron Henry, Rev. R.L.T. Smith,
Rev. G.R. Haughton, and NAACP
field secretary Medgar Evers.
Planning for the boycott campaign
began in the fall of 1962, and included a study of job and consumer
conditions in Jackson. Organizer
John Salter had been impressed by
recent direct action campaigns outside of the state and was eager to
mobilize the local Black community
(Salter, 1987, pp. 39, 51-52). On November 30, 1962, the official bulletin
of the North Jackson Youth Council
(NAACP), the North Jackson Action,
declared "The boycott is now official
. . . picket lines and mass meetings
are definitely set." The front page

highlighted “a brief statement of
grievances" discussing the problem
of employment discrimination, and
continued:
Negro consumers are forced to use
separate restrooms, separate drinking
fountains, and very frequently are
forced to use separate seating facilities
in the stores. Often, they are forced to
stand. Negro customers are the last to
be waited on. In any dispute between
a clerk and a customer, the customer
is always wrong -- if he or she is a
Negro. Many of the white
businessmen are members and
supporters of the viciously antiNegro White Citizens Councilwhose national head- quarters is in
Jackson .... Brutality, levied against.
Negro people, has frequently occurred
in the stores of white businessmen
(North Jackson Youth Council, Papers of John R. Salter, Jr., Box l,
Folder 15).
Attempting to draw further attention to these practices downtown,
picketing demonstrations joined the
selective buying effort in December,
just in time to affect the holiday shopping season. The Youth Council organized a systematic phone calling
campaign and pamphlet distribution
strategies to inform the black community of its actions and goals. Salter
(1987, p. 101) recalls that almost
60,000 leaflets were distributed in
the first six months of the campaign,
and that "boycott workers had spoken at length in almost every Negro
church in Jackson-and most of these
churches had been visited manv times."
Since police harassed or arrested
those engaged in the distribution of
boycott information, student workers
used unusual, sometime secretive
techniques, carrying materials in paper
bags, umbrellas, and under their coats,
moving quickly through different
parts of Jackson (Salter, 1987, p. 71).

77
CSMC

These extraordinary communications efforts were necessary because
the mainstream print and electronic
media of Jackson provided visually no
opportunities for black voices to be
heard or pro-movement arguments to
be made. Two newspapers dominated
the daily print media, namely, the
Clarion-Ledger and the Jackson Daily
News, and were both owned by the
powerful Hederman family, which had a
significant invest- ment in downtown
business as well as the segregationist
status quo. Front page editorials and
columns in these papers frequently
leveled withering attacks on the federal
government and civil rights activities. In
response to the boycott, the papers
offered loud condemnations of it, and
ran ads urging readers to shop downtown.
The Hederman f am ily also controlled a substantial portion of the
broadcast market, owning WJTV one
of two network-affiliated television
stations in Jackson. WJTV's
programming practices, while not the
focus of history textbooks, were quite
similar to those at WLBT. In fact,
the petitioners of WLBT originally
challenged both stations' licenses,
articulating several identical
complaints, including racial
discrimination. In the case of
WJTV, a few signs of programming
adaptability helped shift the focus of
legal efforts to the more recalcitrant
WLBT.
WLBTs connection to the white
business establishment and most
powerful state politicians was quite
dear. Fred Beard, the station's general manager, was a prominent member of the anti-integration White
Citizen's Council, as were many
downtown businessmen and prominent
Mississippi lawmakers (McMillen,
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1971). In fact, on at least one occasion, Beard was vigorously applauded by Citizen's Council members when he announced the station's
active censorship of pro-integration
programming. WLBT also had a
"Freedom Bookstore'' on its premises, filled with Citizen's Council
and white supremacist literature.
Economically, the station had a dose
relationship with Citizen's Council
businessmen and downtown stores in
terms of long-term advertising accounts. In short, the station had very
powerful economic and political allies, and only the marshalling of considerable political and legal resources
would bring about a change in its
racist practices.
It was the station's allies that were
under direct attack during the
Jackson movement. In order to
counter perceptions that it was without concrete goals, the movement
issued a concise list of demands in
January of 1963:
(I) Hiring of personnel on the basis
of personal merit without regard to
race, color or creed; and promotion
of such personnel on the basis of both
merit and seniority without regard to
race, color or creed; (2) an end to
segregated drinking fountains, an end
to segregated re- strooms, and an end
to segregated seat- ing; (3) service to
all consumers on a first come, first
served basis; (4) use of cour- tesy
titles-such as "Miss," "Mrs.," and
"Mr."-with regard to all people (Papers of John R. Salter, Jr., Box I,
Folder 14).
As Liz Cohen (1992, p. 9) has observed, the Jackson movement, while
acknowledging the need for equality
in the sphere of production (hiring
and promotion) focused on the
problems of local black consumption.
In her broader analysis of civil
rights

ill

activism, Cohen identifies the existence of a postwar politics of consumption "oriented around black's
rights as consumers, not just
producers" (p. 8). She argues that
"although access to jobs remained on
the agenda of civil rights activists in
the early 1960s, they now saw
consumption and production rights as
...intenwined" (p. 8).
While articulating "civil rights
problems" during the selective buying campaign, Jackson movement
leaders such as Rev. R.L.T. Smith
put the "denial of human dignity" at
the top of their public complaints,
and called for local recognition of
''freedom and human dignity" at
mass meetings held in Jackson
churches (Papers of Rev. R.L.T.
Smith, Box 3, Folder 28). Clearly,
this call was associated with the concrete experiences of African Americans shopping in downtown Jackson,
denied access to bathrooms and water fountains, and often ignored by
white employees. In the months after the movement disbanded, the petitioners challenging WLBT echoed
this theme, complaining that the station undermined black dignity by failing, for example, to use courtesy titles
in addressing black personalities and
events.
The Jackson movement's concerns
and demands were quite different
from those articulated by John
Kennedy just months earlier on behalf of what he called the "American
consumer." The president identified
four primary consumer concerns and
corresponding rights: (1) the "right
to safety" which dealt with protection from hazardous goods; (2) the
"'right to be informed," which was
concerned with protection against
fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly mis-

leading information in media such as
broadcast advertising; (3) "the right.
to choose," concerned with "access
to a variety of products and services
at competitive prices"; and (4) "the
right to be heard,'' an assurance "'that
consumer interests will receive full
and sympathetic consideration in the
formulation of government policy,
and fair and expeditious treatment
in its administrative tribunals" (such
as the FTC and FCC) (Lampman, J
988, p. 22).
Such pronouncements could be
understood as both expansive and
restrictive. While the president's
speech provided a symbolic alliance
with "the American consumer," and
symbolically expanded "consumer
rights,'' it also set implicit limitations
on the government's interests in these
matters. As one of his key speech
writers has put it, Kennedy's announcement of these "rights" served
to "define and limit the field of consumer protection and to identify legitimate policy choices vis-a-vis consumer markets" (Lampman, 1988.
p. 31). Aside from a cautious and
vague endorsement of consumer representation, the executive statement
established as paramount safer goods
and "improving the level of consumer satisfaction from a given level
of expenditure" (Lampman, 1988, p.
29).
Focusing on consumer satisfaction
derived from favorable economic exchange, Kennedy implicitly defined
the "American consumer'' as individualized and autonomous, enjoying free access to the marketplace
independent of the social divisions
and constraints experienced everyday by thousands of Jackson shoppers. Missing was the movement's
recognition of a basic need to affirm
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the human dignity and worth of consumers. The Jackson movement had
issued its own version of a bill of
rights for consumers, arguing that
an entire class of citizens had been
abused within, and often excluded
from, the free marketplace. At the
same time, in Washington, political
discourse symbolically erased social
differences in consumer experiences
and worked to reestablish the vision
of a fundamentally fair marketplace
that balanced the interests of individual consumers and producers.
Certainly these segregated consumers had been influenced by the
popular consumerist discourse of the
period, as is evident both in the
Jackson movement's newsletters and
more widely throughout the South
(Cohen, 1992). However, the meanings of consumerism were appropriated differently and specifically in
response to crises such as those experienced in Jackson. It is clear that the
direct action campaign undertaken
in Mississippi's capital contained a
considerable current of dissatisfaction with the federal government,
law, and formal announcements from
Washington. Local direct action represented impatience with legal and
bureaucratic efforts. As Silver ( 1963,
p. 342) and others have noted, many
activists in the state were "unimpressed with legalism and and
constitutionalism," favoring the use
of grassroots campaigns aimed at
problems needing immediate remedy.
In this environment the license of
WLBT-TV was challenged. The station never faced a direct action campaign, although African Americans
had long complained about its programming. Rather, the battle over
WLBT would be waged primarily in
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the realm of the legal and bureaucratic, with all of its attendant dangers. Because local black Mississippians lacked the enormous economic
and legal resources necessary for a
protracted licensing battle and administrative challenge, the task fell
largely to media activists and attorneys associated with the United
Church of Christ (UCC).

Shifting Standards of Standing
Before the challenge from the UCC
and its co-petitioners, both the FCC
and federal courts handling broadcasting concerns had granted "standing to intervene" only to legislators
and those parties "operating in the
public interest," demonstrating sufficient economic injury or electrical
interference. Those parties successfully claiming economic injury and
electrical interference were invariably commercial and industrial entities. Although the courts insisted that
standing was considered in the light
of larger public rather than private
interest concerns, members of the
listening and viewing audience, "the
public," were not formally and directly recognized or represented, but
only indirectly considered through
the various arguments of industry
and government. As one legal analyst summarized, "the courts had apparently given at least tacit approval
to the [Federal Communication]
Commission's standing construction,
for in no instance had standing to
contest a licensing order been upheld on any other ground" ("Recent
developments," 1967, p. 520). That
is, until 1966, with the release of the
WLBT-TV decision.
With WLBT, the courts' position
on standing shifted. Dissatisfied with
the aforementioned precedents, the

Court of Appeals established that the
Such remarks implied the Court
listening public was now to be consid- of Appeals was attempting to disered as potentially "aggrieved" by tance itself from the FCC. Passages
renewal of broadcast station licenses, such as the one above suggest that
and as a potential "party in interest" the commission had a certain inflexempowered to challenge license ibility which the court was now rebukgrants and renewals. In granting ing and positioning as detrimental to
standing to the appellants, Warren the public interest.
Burger wrote for Circuit Judges
This r e b u k e se e ms to h a ve little
McGowan and Tamm:
justification in terms of legal coherSince the concept of standing is a practi- ency. Indeed, in terms of coherency.
cal and functional one designed to in- the commission's, not the court's, desure that only those with a genuine and cision would seem to be much stronlegitimate interest can participate in a ger. The former's determination w a s
proceeding, we can see no reason to based on well- established and often
exclude those with such an obvious and cited precedents such as FCC r1. Sanacute concern as the listening audience. ders Brothers Radio Station ( 1940),
This much seems essential to insure that Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC
the holders of broadcasting licenses be ( 1942), and NBC v. FCC (1942). It is
responsive to the needs of the audience, also worth repeating that the court
without which the broadcaster could not had given at least its tacit approval to
these prior commission construcexist (59 F.2d 1002).
In granting standing to represen- tions of standing.
However, in this case, the court
tatives of the "listening audience,"
the court recognized it had broken took great pains to f oreground the
away from previous, more restricted flexibility and dynamism of standnotions of standing, admitting that ing. Standing was defined as a "prac"'up to this time, the courts have tical and functional concept." After
granted standing to intervene only to tracing a case history of standing law.
those alleging electrical interfer- the court remarked, "This history
ence ... or alleging some economic indicates that neither administrative
injury" (359 F.2d 1000). However, nor judicial concepts of standing have
now the court had decided to ex- been static" (359 F.2d 1000).
In addressing the FCC argument
pand notions of public interest beyond those represented in the con- that the commission itself could fairly
stricted categories of the past. represent the listening audience and
Claiming a new flexibility and ability thus eliminate the need for further
to adapt based on experience, the formal public representation, the
court continued: "... What the Com- court again implied that the commismission apparently fails to see in the sion had been unjustifiably rigid in
present case is that the courts have contrast to the judicial body's reasonresolved questions of standing as they able, flexible, commonsensical dispoarose and have at no time manifested sition. In a passage which damages
an intent to make economic interest claims to formalistic justification by
and electrical interference the exclu- constitutionality, process, or precesive grounds for standing" (359 F.2d dents, Burger wrote that "experi·
ence" linked to an implied "common
1000-1001).
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sense” had guided the decision-making:
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garding standing and WLBT highlighted a problem that is central to
the critical legal studies critique of
The theory that the Commission can
traditional legal practice, namely, the
always effectively represent the listener
8
interests in a renewal proceeding with- fundamental indeterminacy of law.
In this case, the court explicitly disout the aid and participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the posed of the idea that standing had
role of private attorneys general is one of a natural, inherent, or self-evident
those assumptions we collectively try to meaning. Rather, its meaning had
work with so long as they are reasonably been, and continues to be, a site of
adequate. When it becomes clear, as it social and legal struggle, dynamic
does now, that it is no longer a valid
assumption which stands up under the through time and place. In this hisrealities of actual experience, neither we tory, the court made the point of
nor the Commission can continue to rely discarding the arguments regarding
on it. The gradual expansion and evolu- constitutionality, process, and precetion of concepts of standing in adminis- dents advanced by the FCC, suborditrative law attests that experience rather nating such claims to consideration
than logic or fixed rules has been ac- of "nonlegal" variables, such as
cepted as the guide (359 F.2d 1003-industrial and "consumer"
1004).
conditions. Clearly, social factors
This paragraph asserts rather
surrounding the case were important
baldly that the court's standing deci- to the judicial decision.
sions had been based on considerFurther, the court statements to
ations outside those of constitutional- the FCC regarding the strengths of
ity, process, and precedents. It
the minority complaint suggest that
explicitly privileged "experience"
the judges pondered the merits of
over formalistic legal "logic" or "fixed the legal challenge when formal
rules." The grounds for standing had guidelines dictated that standing was
uneasily shifted, with little legal ratio- to be determined a priori (359 F.2d
nale available outside of "it seems to 1006--1009). The court's concluding
be the best decision in this instance, remarks underscored its concern as
given the experience of past years." it surveyed the station's history and
Elaborating on this rationale, Keller
stated "a pious hope on the Commis(1967, p. 135) wrote that the court
sion’s part f o r better t h i n g s
recognized that previously narrow
f r o m WLBT is not a substitute for
constructions of standing "had not
achieved the desired result," ostensi- evidence and findings" (359 F.2d
bly of serving the "public interest," 1008). Critics noticed this formal
and therefore was advocating a new transgression, questioning the
appropriateness of court remarks
standing construction. Even traditional legal analysts noted the court's suggesting how the FCC should
lack of formal justification in this shift, have ruled in its initial statement
stating in one instance that the deci- regarding WLBT li- cense renewal
(38 FCC 1143 [1965]). The
sion underscored the "burdensome
and artificial construction of stand- Michigan Law Review (1967, p.
ing requirements" ("Notes," p. 384). 524), for example, remarked that the
The Court of Appeals' writing re- propriety of the court's approach was
questionable" since policy determina-

tions are clearly within the
exclusive scope of the Commission’s
expertise.”
The WBLT case does not stand
alone in regard to this type of formal
transgression. In analysis of
constitutional standing, for example,
critics have argued that standing has
become “a surrogate for decisions on
merits” and that the law of standing
“is little more than a set of disjointed
rules dealing with dealing with a
common subject” (Tushnett, 1977, p.
663). In this surrogacy, standing law
denies its social construction and
social specificity, cloaking itself in
an a priori rationale claiming a clean
separation from consideration of
contemporary social conditions.
The WLBT decision threatens to
strip this cloak from standing law,
exposing the social and cultural
forces at work I such decisionmaking. A more than cursory
examination of the precedent-setting
1966 Court of Appeals decision
supports the contention that standing
law is fundamentally indeterminate
as are the meanings of specific legal
terms such as “the public interest.”
Further, it reveals a moment in which
formalistic justification for legal
standing and specific case merits
were conflated in an environment of
considerable social struggle.
Transforming Viewers
To better understand the 1966 Court
decision regarding standing, it is
necessary to look more closely at how this
judicial body defined various social
groups and consider how these definitions
related to a specific social milieu. This is
not to suggest that legal texts or
definitions simply reflect the social realm,
but that such discourses emerge in an
interactive and creative way, working on
social

conditions even as such conditions shape
them.
By 1960 broadcasting was increasingly
defined as a consumer concern. Quiz show
scandals and FCC commissioner
misconduct had brought television into
disrepute, and these exploitations of a
relatively young and promising medium
were widely publicized in the popular
press, arousing public dissatisfaction
(Boddy, 1990). At the same time,
prominent political leaders such as
Kennedy campaigned to align themselves
with government protection or the
consumer (Pertschuk, 1982). As Pertschuk
( 1982, p. 17) has noted, Kennedy's
"consumer" campaign speech was greeted
enthusiastically, and "opinion polls showed
broad, though not necessarily deep, public
endorsement of ... consumer protection
initiatives."
In 1962, the president established a
Consumer Advisory Council which had
liaisons with various federal administrative
agencies, including the FCC. And in 1964,
as Lyndon Johnson established the
President's Committee on Consumer
Interests, his special assistant for consumer
affairs, Esther Peterson, continued the
communication between the executive
branch and the FCC. During these years,
the White House occasionally asked the
commission for an account of activities it
had undertaken in the interest of the
American consumer. Thus, FCC actions
such as their work on the "All Channel
Receiver Bill" were called to the attention
of the White House as "efforts to help the
consumer" (Papers of E. William Henry,
Box 76, "Assistant for Consumer Affairs"
and "White House Correspondence").!~
In the popular press, a January,

1960, cover article titled "Where, may
we ask, was the FCC?" in Consumer
Reports, blasted the commission for
inactivity and "passing the buck" especially in regard to "false and
irritating" advertising. The article
warned that by flooding air channels
with poor programming and ads,
broadcasting companies could "decimate the consumer use-value of all
receiving sets" (p. 9). Calling for the
"implementation of the consumer position in Government," the article
nominated television as the nation's
dominant consumer concern, stating
"the consumer investment in and the
consumer interest in television and
radio dwarf that of any other
segment" (pp. 11, 9).
Faced with public anxiety over advertising and claims that ads were
increasingly false and pervasive, the
FCC, under the leadership of Newton
Minow (1961-63) and William Henry
(1963-66), launched campaigns
against overcommercialization in
broadcasting (Baughman, 1985, pp.
117-152). Congressional members,
acting as defenders of the broadcast
industry, were persistent in curtailing these administrative agency efforts. However, powerful FCC commissioners believed that the public
shared their displeasure with the
number of commercials aired and the
"ever increasing interruption of
programs" (Baughman, 1985, p.
123).
William Henry, FCC chair during
the early years of the WLBT challenge, encouraged the commission's
broadcast bureau to "closely check
individual renewal applications for
the number of commercial messages
pledged on the license form versus
those actually aired" (Baughman,
1985, p. 134). In mid-1964, the

broadcast bureau, again with Henry's
support, unsuccessfully attempted to
take punitive action against specific
stations located in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas accused of broadcasting too many commercials
(Baughman, 1985, p. 135).
With this as a historical backdrop,
the legal texts of the WLBT struggle
are better understood. For example, it
comes as no surprise that the United
Church of Christ legal team,
counseled by former FCC staff member Ann Aldrich, included a complaint of overcommercialization in
the WLBT petition to deny licensing. Such a complaint, seemingly
trivial in comparison to charges of
racist programming, resonated with
public and FCC concerns. Even after
the 1966 court decision ignored the
overcommercialization charge, the
UCC petitioned the FCC to revisit its
complaint regarding too many ads (5
FCC2d 37).
Beyond the contention that advertisements were too frequent and interruptive, anxieties regarding false
or misleading ads were closely linked
to notions of consumerism and economic protection. Applied to broadcasting, the logic of consumerism
again focused on expenditure and
the viewer's return from financial investment. Consumer protection was
not so much protection from frustration or annoyance or more threatening systemic injustices as from uninformed, irrational, or unwise
investment-in other words, protection from "not getting one's money's
worth." This concern was evident,
for example, in the 1960 Consumer
Reports article, as it foregrounded
public spending on television and
radio purchases and spoke of "consumer use-value." This economic

logic was also clear in the arguments
employed by the UCC legal team in
the WLBT case, and was adopted by
the court in its 1966 opinion. The
contention of the petitioners was that
the public, through ownership of sets
and their appurtenances, had a large
economic stake in broadcasting, had
not received a fair return for its investment, and therefore deserved legal standing as an economically aggrieved party (Parker, 1982).
This argument provided the awkward equation through which the
court defined local African-American concerns as synonymous with the
those of the American consumer. The
judges gave considerable discussion
to the specific history and practices
of WLBT early in the opinion, focusing hard on the allegations of racial
discrimination. However, as the court
articulated its position regarding the
issue of standing, considerations of
this history dropped out of its writing in deference to formal constraints
dictating standing be considered only
in relation to specific persons, firms,
or corporations, rather than social
classes or groups.
Such constraints were, and continue to be, the product of American
legal liberalism-a philosophical
framework that reproduces the artificial dichotomization of the individual and society and inconsistently
privileges individual liberty over social responsibility. Working and writing within this tradition, the court
was formally mandated to address
specific economic grievances-individual material losses-rather than
systemic discrimination. This was,
and is, the purview of administrative
jurisprudence.
Thus the court drew parallels between the consumers of margarine.

coal, electricity, and broadcasting, arguing that consumers of these and
other commodities had certain economic claims, and in some cases had
been granted temporary standing before administrative agencies such as
the Federal Trade Commission. Contending that television "consumers"
and consumers of margarine needed
similar administrative protections, the
court's opinion reflected a temporary
and artificial, yet formally
demanded, separation of social justice
from individual consumer concerns.
The court's defense of individuated television consumers was
summed up with a quotation from
Edmond Cahn: "Some consumers
need bread; others need Shakespeare;
others need their rightful place in the
national society-what they all need is
processors of law who will consider
the people's needs more significant
than administrative convenience"
(359 F.2d 1005). Employing such
liberal proclamations, the court
transposed middle-class assumptions
onto other groups, in this case, predominantly working and underclass
African Americans in the nation's
poorest state. Discussing which parties should be officially recognized
rather than deemed legally invisible,
the court effectively subordinated
concrete cultural concerns regarding
popular representation to the
economic logic of consumer protection.
The argument that viewers should
be principally defined as consumers
owning television sets, thus holding
an economic stake in local broadcasting, had little resonance with many
poor African Americans, even if accepted at face value. Such consumer
protections assumed the citizen was
economically independent, when this
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was hardly the case for many black
Mississippians. Truly independent
consumer choices were a luxury afforded relatively few African Americans in the state. Further, although
television purchases escalated nationwide in the sixties, census data reveal
that "nonwhite" households in Mississippi lagged well behind other populations in the acquisition of this technology, at least in the late fifties.
Considerably less than half, approximately 40 percent of "nonwhite"
households in Mississippi had televisions as the decade began, compared to
television's presence in 66 percent of
"all occupied households in the
state." In impoverished rural areas,
even a smaller percentage of nonwhite
households had a set at home (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1963).
Thus, the court's discussion of
standing via consumerism, while
resonating with federal legislation
prohibiting public discrimination
against customers, effectively ignored
important social differences and histories in a construction of the homogenized, individualized television
viewer-consumer. Anxiety regarding
the state's address of racial conflict
was displaced by "consumer" and
"public interest" concerns, and in a
larger sense, by the formal demands
of legal liberalism, with its dichotomization of public and private, as well
as individual and social, interests.
This symbolic displacement, however temporary, allowed the state,
represented by the Court of Appeals,
to address a race-based threat t.o social and economic stability, via an
official legal discourse, without directly appearing to offer such an address. As Vincent Mosco (1989, p.
118) points out in a discussion of
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government, hegemony, and federal
broadcast policy, the state is responsible for controlling antagonisms before they become systemic conflicts.
One of the means noted as working
toward this end is identification of
social agents not as members of antagonistic classes [or races]-but as
individual legal subjects. In complementary fashion, "the state presents
itself as the agent for solving the
problems of individual juridicial
citizens..." (Mosco, 1989, p. 119). In
Washington, the Kennedy administration threw support behind endeavors aimed at the furtherance of
individual voting and consumer
rights rather than rallies and largescale public protests. As historian
David Chalmers (1991, pp. 23, 40)
has noted, the national government
was not willing to directly challenge the
Southern status quo much be- yond
the issue of voting rights, and as "the
civil rights strategy of the early
sixties increasingly became one of
forcing the issue in the streets, ... the
administration treated it as a problem
of conflict containment." Members of
the Jackson movement frequently
complained about the lack of federal
support for their highly visible direct
action campaign. In this case, the
court's choice to deal with the
petitioners as representative of
consumers worked to atomize or isolate the complainants as individual
consumers of the television programming. The court's employment of the
Cahn quotation foregrounded this
atomization quite clearly, with the
message that "some consumers need
this, others that." The court's alternative, guarded against by the rules
and procedures of legal liberalism,
was more menacing-to recognize
that the petitioners represented the

concerns of a race or an aggregate
threat.
CONCLUSION
In addressing the WLBT case, FCC
Chairman E. William Henry declared
in 1965 that the issue at hand was
"not civil rights," but "the integrity
of the public interest standard and
the Commission's renewal process''
(38 FCC 1153). This study directly
challenges such a claim, arguing the
WLBT case was very much about
civil rights, as well as other social
dynamics. The symbolic evacuation
of racial struggle evident in Henry's
quotation, if accepted uncritically,
leads t o a superficial understanding
of an important moment in
American law and history, and
reinforces a dichotomy of legal
reasoning and social change. To
contend that notions such as the
"public interest," or the formalistic
legal/administrative process, are the
central issues in such a case is to
grant them an undeserved autonomy-one that denies their relationship to,
and degree of dependence on, central
social and political forces.
Situating the WLBT-TV fight
within the 1960s civil rights movement
reveals how this struggle echoes the
strategies and ambiguous legacy of the
movement as a whole.10 On the level
of local and tactical politics, such
challenges were part of campaigns that
offered moments of empowerment and
resistance for African Americans.
Although it is difficult to gauge the
empowerment experienced by black
Mississippians in their moments of
resistance and challenge to WLBT, the
local implications of such activism
should not be ignored or devalued. At
the very least, the attacks on WLBT
forced Jackson stations

to curb practices that were deeply
painful to people of color, and
initiated the process by which the
station was awarded to a majorityblack coalition in 1979.
On another level, in terms of industrial and regulatory structures or existing patterns of power, the station
challenge and court decisions did
little more than ratify the status quo
by suggesting that the regulatory system was corrective-that it indeed
worked. While the 1966 ruling regarding legal standing for WLBT
viewers energized and facilitated the
broadcast reform movement, by the
late seventies further bureaucratic retrenchment effectively diminished the
power of this legal precedent and
ensuing activism even before Reagan
administration deregulation. II
With the Reagan administration,
an argument was reenergized that
continues today, namely that address of legal questions such as standing or rights should be color-blind.
This contention is prominent in contemporary debates revolving around
problems as varied as voting rights
and FCC licensing. Hopefully, the
analysis offered here warns that to
adopt a color-blind approach or address is to, among other things, abstract issues of race from history and
reproduce the liberal myth of a fundamentally fair marketplace that
magically balances disparate social interests. Critical observers of race relations and law convincingly demonstrate that the ahistorical standard of
color-blindness fails to achieve the
race neutrality it formally claims. As
one African-American scholar puts it,
to believe "that color-blind policies
represent the only legitimate and
effective means of ensuring a racially
equitable society, one would have to
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the examination of these breaks or
formal gaps, there should be a sensitivity to the struggle surrounding official and popular discourses, such as
those of consumerism, and their intersection with law. In the sixties,
consumerism was invoked both by
civil rights activists and federal institutions in the context of establishing
Law and legal writing aspire to
new law or policy. For those in the
formal- ized, color-blind, liberal ideals.
Jackson movement, consumer concerns called for the recognition of
Neutral- ity is the standard for assuring
social differences and a response to
these ideals; yet the adherence to it is
the historic, long-term neglect of the
often determined by reference to an
free market. From Washington, the
aesthetic of uniformity, in which
discourses of consumerism effaced
difference is simply omitted. For
social differences and tensions, reexample, when segregation was
producing the model of the individeradicated from the American lexicon,
uated American consumer and the
its omission led many to believe that
vision of an essentially fair, consumerracism therefore no longer existed.
producer balanced society. In the
rhetoric of the Court of Appeals and
Race-neutrality in law has become the
institutions of law, we see the uncompresumed antidote for race bias in real
fortable mediation of these conflictlife.
ing consumerisms, and an attempt to
Even as American law proclaims address racial tensions accompanied
its lack of formal bias, we can see in by a simultaneous displacement of
specific instances, such as the WLBT these concerns.
case, that social concerns and pressures often force breaks in legal reasoning--disjunctures that are inadequately explained by law itself. In

assume ... that such a racially equitable society already exists" (Crenshaw,
1988, p. 1344). In the formal claims
of color-blindness and equal process,
social and historical differences are
dismissed. A quote from Patricia
Williams (1991, p. 48) serves well in
summarizing this point:

NOTES
1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1993 meeting of the Society for Cinema
Studies. I gratefully acknowledge the consistent encouragement and insights of John Fiske and Lynn
Spigel, and thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable critiques.
2Among the early leadership of the Movement were John and Eldri Salter of Tougaloo College
and Medgar Evers, field secretary of the Mississippi NAACP. The Salters began working with the
North Jackson Youth Council of the NAACP shortly after their 1961 arrival in Jackson. This Council
formed the early core of the Movement. John Salter recalls that a great majority of recruits to the
Movement were high school students, and that they had "reached the point where they perceived
the injustices very clearly, and they also saw the vision very clearly. They just didn't feel inhibited
...they were the backbone of the boycott and the backbone of the mass marches" (Oral History of
John Salter, pp. 29-30). In 1963, after his appointment as chaplain at Tougaloo, the Reverend Ed
King also played a key leadership role in Movement activities.
3Kennedy's March 15, 1962 speech was titled "Special Message to the Congress on
Protecting the Consumer Interest" ("Public papers," pp. 235-243). Creighton (1976) de- scribes
this public employment of concern for the consumer, noting that in political speeches consumers could
be attractively framed as "individuals and households unsullied by govern- mental malfeasance" (p.
42). Pertschuk (1982) also provides insightful analysis of this period. A focus on the "consumer" was not
only evident in political pronouncements, but in popular

press treatments of civil rights activism. For example, in NBC"s three hour primetime special tided 'The
American Revolution of 1968,•• a '"study of the American Negro's struggle for equality," host Frank
Magee sought to "define this revolution" as having as an immediate goal "what might be called consumer
rights as easily as civil rights...."
4This approach is informed by work in the critical legal studies (CLS) movement. For example,
in an introduction to CLS, Kelman (1987) writes, "CLS theorists have devoted" great deal of their efforts
to demonstrating that law and society are inseparable or interpenetrating and arguing that traditional
pictures of that relationship between law and society that ignore that point almost invariably make law
seem both more important than it is (in supposing that particular structures require particular rules) and
less important than it. is (in ignoring its basic constitutive nature)" (p. 7).
5As Haight and Weinstein (1981) have observed, the victory of local petitioners in the WLBT
case "gave tremendous hope to prospective petitioners that further gains could be made by taking this
'legal route'" (p. 115). Such challenges were viewed as opening "doors for reforming the media through
the administrative process" (Haight and Weinstein, p. I 15: also see Branscomb and Savage, 1978). As
scholars have subsequently noted, these hopes for long-term reform were poorly founded (Rowland,
1982; Haight and Weinstein, 1981). However, the WLBT case offered strategic legal "tools" for broadcast
reform activities in the late sixties and early seventies. The writings of Rowland (1982) and Haight and
Weinstein (1981) go beyond simple historical description to provide productive critical analyses of this
period.
6The definition of television and radio as primarily commercial enterprises with attendant
consumer concerns is evident throughout the history of .American broadcasting and broad- cast
regulation. From their earliest years, radio and television were regulated as "interstate commerce" in
accordance with the Constitution's interstate "commerce clause"' of Article I. Section 8. Thus,
congressional oversight of radio and television has long been justified by broadcasting's commercial
"nature." Along these lines, it. is interesting to note that important challenges to segregation came through
the commercial sector, and found legal grounding in interstate commerce regulation (for example, the
Interstate Commerce Commission’s orders to abolish Jim Crow facilities and practices).
7Although the 1964 petition to deny the license ofWLB"1"-TV followed local field work and
studies conducted in 1963, 1963-64 was not the first period of local complaint against the station.
African-American efforts to change local broadcast practices began earlier, prior to the intention and
involvement of the UCC. Specifically, Medgar Evers and the NAACP filed complaints against the
segregationist practices of the station in 1955 and 1957. In the latter year, WLBTs treatment of the Little
Rock school crisis prompted Evers to request airtime. He was denied. The FCC showed no interest in
intervention, though made aware of the situation by the NAACP. In 1957 the Commission granted WLBT
a "license to cover construction permit," and in 1959 renewed the station’s license without a hearing on
local complaints (40 FCC 479).
8Streeter (1990) offers a description of the intellectual contributions made by the critical legal
studies (CLS) movement as well as a discussion of
applications to communications policy It
should be noted that within critical scholarship, the work of CLS students has been variously challenged
and complimented by texts engaging the perspectives of African Americans. Legal analysts such as
Patricia Williams (1991), Derrick Bell (1987. 1992), and Kimberlee Crenshaw (1988) show an
appreciation for CLS interventions while maintaining important differences. and provide insights
regarding the racial politics of law and its operations.
9President Kennedy mentioned the ""All Channel Receiver Bill,·· then pending adoption b)
Congress, in his 1962 "Consumer Interest" address. In this speech the president also touched on other
"consumer" concerns being addressed by the administration, including television programming. In part,
Kennedy stated, ''The Federal Communications Communications Commission is actively reviewing
the television network program selection process and encouraging the expanded development of
educational television stations'" ("Public papers." p. 2 7).
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10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I consider this parallel.
11 Rowland ( 1982) argues along these lines in regard to the broadcast reform efforts of the
sixties and seventies, highlighting "The symbolic dimension of the process, the significance of broadcast
reform as part of an overall political legitimization-of ratification of prior structural arrangements and
power allocations..."(p. 3). Examples of bureaucratic retrenchment in regard to citizen standing are
perhaps most obvious in the FCC's erection of a procedural labyrinth for citizen petitioners, beginning in
1972 (see 'The Public and Broad- casting-A Procedure Manual," September 26, 1972, 37 FCC 2d 286).
In its complex "'Procedure Manual'" for citizens' groups, the FCC made it clear that broadcast
performance inquiries were to be initiated by private citizens, not the commission, and that the burden of
proof rested on the shoulders of challenging parties (Rowland, 1982, p. 17).
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